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This chapter examines contemporary conflicts and stalemates in the broader 
Mediterranean region. While emphasizing there is no single uniform model of a 
µ0HGLWHUUDQHDQ¶FRQIOLFWRUVWDOHPDWHit points to a number of shared patterns and 
commonalities in such regional ethnopolitical issues as the Arab-Israeli, Balkan, 
Spanish/Catalan, Cypriot, Greek-Turkish, Kurdish, and post-Arab spring conflicts. 
Specifically, it asks why most peace-building projects have failed despite the visible 
involvement of European and international organizations and despite historical 
legacies of tolerance and accommodation in the Mediterranean region. Focusing on 
intra-state conflict, it argues that dominant groups have been reluctant to 
accommodate diversity, preferring to maintain mutually hurtful and destructive 
stalemates. To shed light on this puzzling pattern, the chapter cites recent failures to 
accommodate diversity, showing how dominant nationalisms have used negative 
demonstration effects and false analogies from the past to constraint attempts at 
political accommodation.  
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Political Accommodation and Stalled Conflicts 
Stalled conflicts in the Mediterranean particularly intra-state conflicts are explicitly 
linked to failures in embracing political accommodation including for instance federal 
or consociational models.1 This is a paradox as historically,  the region even its most 
conflictual eastern part has hosted a multiplicity of popular federal movements and 
nationalist ideologies, for example, among the Balkan nations (Stavrianos 1959), the 
Southern Slavs (Banac 1983, 1984), Macedonians (Rossos 2008), Greeks and Turks 
(Anagnostopoulou 1997; Veremis 1989), Israeli and Palestinians (Yiftachel 2006) and 
pan-Arab nationalists (Ajami 1978; Dawisha 2003). 
Looking at the devastating civil wars in the post-Arab spring era, it is difficult 
to imagine the strength of pan-Arab nationalism a few decades earlier. The United 
Arab Republic was a popular but short-lived manifestation of this failed project. Other 
potentially federalizable Mediterranean sub-regions have also failed, as for instance, 
the long-dreamed-of federation among the Balkan people, or more specifically, 
among South Slavs, including Habsburg and Ottoman âtokavian speakers; the latter 
GLDOHFWµXQLWHG¶WKH6HUER-Croat-Bonsiak linguistic world and set the stage for the 
political union of the South Slavs. Nonetheless, when the former Yugoslavia fell 
apart, this particular section did not manage to maintain its µIHGHUDOXQLW\¶GHVSLWHa 
shared language and rich intellectual traditions. While western media initially pointed 
to its ethnic diversity as a cause of its violent breakdown, this argument seems 
limited. For instance federalism was equally short-lived DPRQJWKHµHWKQLFally-
UHODWHG¶6HUEVDQG0RQWHQHJULQV5DPHW Likewise, the attempt to federalize 
Libya in three main provinces lasted only for about a decade (1951-1963). Following 
0XDPPDU*DGGDIL¶VWDNH-over in 1969, federal options between Libya and its 
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neighbors were negotiated, first with Egypt and Syria and then with Tunisia, but both 
attempts ended in acrimony (Dawisha 2003).  
Meanwhile, early consociational attempts in the Mediterranean UHJLRQ¶V
smaller multiethnic states, including Cyprus (Kyriakides 1968; Markides 1977) and 
Lebanon (Zahar 2005; Dekmejian 1978) led to similarly violent breakdowns. Both 
cases commonly feature as major examples of unsuccessful consociationalism in the 
relevant literature (Schneckener 2000; Lijphart 1996). The Cyprus stalemate is 
particularly puzzling, as reunification talks have failed to reach a comprehensive 
settlement despite a signed agreement on bicommunal administration since 1977-79, 
strong pro-federalist positions embraced by at least three main political parties in the 
island (i.e. AKEL, DISY and CTP), and the proactive involvement of international 
and regional organizations including the United Nations and the European Union 
(Richmond 2005; Anastasiou 2008; Ker-Lindsay 2011). 
In another telling case, Turkey could have mitigated its own stalled conflict 
with its Kurdish minority through political accommodation in the form of 
decentralization. In the Turkish as well as the Egyptian cases, we could point to the 
large population as an important pre-existing enabling condition for decentralisation . 
Both current stalemates could, in theory, be addressed by LQWURGXFLQJµLQIRUPDO¶
federal or consociational arrangements, as in South Africa, Singapore or Spain, to 
regulate conflict with territorial and non-territorial minorities. Instead, the AK Party 
has governed Turkey with little formal or informal power-sharing with either Kurds 
or rival Kemalist political parties. Likewise, in post-Mubarak Egypt, the choice of a 
(majoritarian) presidential system has deepened the conflict between supporters of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the military, reversing the brief achievements of the Arab 
Spring. Tunisia, on the contrary opted for proportional parliamentary democracy 
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mitigating the conflicts between political Islam and secularism.  
  
Perceptions of Stalemates and Political Accommodation 
,QDGGUHVVLQJVWDOOHGFRQIOLFWV³KDZNV´XVXDOO\GUDZIURP grievances, hatred, and 
security dilemmas (Jervis, 1978; Kaufman, 2011; Petersen, 2011), while ³GRYHV´ 
point to mutually-hurting stalemates and opportunities for compromise through some 
form of political accommodation (Zartman, 1989; McGarry 2011; Heraclides, 2001). 
Perceptions are central in evaluating the claims of each camp. A prevalent perception 
in the region is that power-sharing is unnecessary because people have been living in 
peace and harmony for ages. Integrationist and assimilationist programs downplaying 
ethnic differences are common, particularly in left-wing political movements. By 
emphasizing D³P\WKLFDOSHDFHIXOSDVW´DQG³unity over minority rights´, leftist 
movements have restricted, even undermined, federal and consociational prospects. 
Perceptions challenging the very existence of minorities, let alone their rights, are 
fundamental to the UHJLRQ¶Vprotracted conflicts and stalemates. Even if individuals 
are welcome as equals in nation-building, cultural rights are violated.  
Historically, the failure of the Arab unity project could be attributed to its 
HPSKDVLVRQµXQLW\¶UDWKHUWKDQµGLYHUVLW\;¶LQSULQFLSOH, diversity could have been 
accommodated using federal and consociational devices. This is also true for Turkey 
and its Kurdish minorities but applies equally well to Shiite versus Sunni conceptions 
of Arab unity (and their respective fears). Other cases in the region, particularly those 
in Spain (Catalans and Basques) and Italy (South Tyrol) suggest the viability of an 
alternative route. Mediating power-sharing requires explicit (constitutional) 
commitments to minorities that the achievement of µnational XQLW\¶ZLOOQRWSUHFOXGH
diversity. Credible constitutional arrangements should aim to safeguard minorities 
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from the loss of autonomy or representation while majorities should be protected from 
dysfunctional constitutional provisions and secession. The major advantage of federal 
and consociational arrangements is that they frequently offer the most credible way to 
address security, financial or identity risks, while combining shared goals with 
separate spheres of government for majorities and significant minorities. Likewise, 
power-sharing, either through guaranteed group representation in the central 
government or through territorial decentralization and federalism, could be 
XQGHUVWRRGDVDIRUPRIµFRPSHQVDWLRQ¶IRUJURXSVOLNHO\WRUHVLVWDµKHJHPRQLF¶RU
assimilationist state, as they will now have a vested interest in the power-sharing 
structure.  
In both Yugoslavia and the Arab-speaking world, attempts at state-building 
have failed to balance the tensions between unity and diversity, leading to 
disintegration and conflict. In the case of Iraq, Dawisha argues these tensions became 
evident during the peak of Arab nationalism in 1958 following the July 14 coup and 
WKHHPHUJHQFHRIULYDOSDUWLHV)RUWKHµ,UDT)LUVW*URXS¶LVVXHVRISUHVHUYLQJ
GLYHUVLW\DFURVVHWKQLFDQGUHOLJLRXVOLQHVZHUHFULWLFDOµ$UDE8QLW\ZDVVHHQDVD
Sunni project designated to ensure the ultimate subjugation of the non-Sunni 
FRPPXQDOJURXSV¶Dawisha 2003:219). He adds that the Iraqi First gURXSµZDVQRW
necessarily averse to some form of union, but theirs was a much looser conception 
than that held by the nationalists, at most a federal arrangement in which Iraq would 
UHWDLQFRQVLGHUDEOHDXWRQRP\¶LELG: 216). A similar pattern emerged in Syria, 
eventually resulting in the failure of the larger Arab unity project (ibid).  
 For their part, South Slav federal/state-building projects fell short of balancing 
regional/federal autonomy with national solidarity. 8VLQJWKHWHUPµIODZHG
XQLILFDWLRQ¶Banac (1984:13) says Yugoslavia failed to meet the promise of its 
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intellectual founding fathers. This was particularly true in interwar Yugoslavia, 
originally called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. According to Ramet, its 
FRPSRQHQWSHRSOHVµFDPH to the kingdom with rather different expectations and for 
GLIIHUHQWUHDVRQV¶/LNH.XUGVLQ,UDTWRGD\&URDWVDQG6ORYHQHVVRXJKW
security, aligning with the new Kingdom to protect themselves from further territorial 
losses to Italy but also hoping for a federal constitution (ibid). But Serbian elites 
assumed political, economic and cultural hegemony within the new state, adopting 
strict centralism. And as in the pan-Arab FDVHµWKHSROLF\RIPRQRSROL]LQJWKHWRS
posts in the country for Serbs was at the minimum, politically insensitive likely to 
give provocation, and short-VLJKWHG¶Ramet 2006:37).  
The general insistence on integration/assimilation largely explains the conflict 
trajectory in the Mediterranean region. For instance, Iraqi centralists downplayed 
crimes against Kurds by attributing these exclusively to the Saddam Hussein regime. 
Turkish nationalists, mostly on the left, voice similar arguments when discussing their 
own Kurdish national minorities, attributing crimes to previous regimes. Yet since the 
mid-1990s, the Turkish left has found limited support among the Kurdish minority. 
Even after the election of a moderate leader from the region, .HPDO.ÕOÕoGDUR÷OX as 
PUHVLGHQWWKHPDLQRSSRVLWLRQSDUW\&+35HSXEOLFDQ3HRSOH¶VParty), won only a 
tiny fraction of its votes in Kurdish regions, thus failing to create a new platform from 
which to transcend the stalemate.  
 
Stalemates and Failing Political Settlements  
A second dominant perception of stalled conflicts is that multi-ethnic states are prone 
to failure. This is particularly true of (but not limited to) those espousing right-wing 
nationalisms, which frequently see any recognition of ethnic or religious diversity as a 
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stepping-stone to secession. Right-wing nationalisms have a particularly strong 
attachment to power, authority and territory, frequently treating sovereignty in a non-
negotiable manner while attributing conflicts with their minorities to external 
interference.  
In the narratives of most Middle East and Balkan nationalisms, territories 
µZRQRUNHSWZLWKEORRG¶DUHQRWLQDQ\VHQVHUHQHJRWLDEOHWKURXJKIHGHUDORU
consociational arrangements. Unsurprisingly, then, remembrance of fallen soldiers is 
DFHQWUDOWKHPHLQWKHUHJLRQ¶VRIILFLDOGLVFRXUVHV, as demonstrated, for instance, in 
Turkey¶VVWDQFHRQ PKK casualties in the 1990s (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 118). 
Parliamentary debates are telling; for instance, in his 1995 speech to the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly, conservative President Süleyman Demirel remembered 
ZLWKFRPSDVVLRQDOO7XUNH\¶VµPDUW\UVDQGRXUWHDFKHUVZKRKDYHEHFRPHYLFWLPVRI
terrorism while trying to educate our children through great self-VDFULILFH¶(Loizides, 
2016: 216). And even though Recep Tayyip Erdo÷an initially attempted to 
accommodate Kurdish minority rights, he eventually adopted the major principles of 
Turkish conservative nationalist ideology.  
Elsewhere in the region, various contemporary political parties have drawn 
their inspiration from national liberation movements, as in Croatia (HDZ), the 
Republic of Macedonia/FYROM (VMRO-DPMNE), Cyprus (DISY among Greek 
Cypriots, UBP among Turkish Cypriots) and Lebanon (Kataeb Party), to mention 
only a few. Yet these political parties have shown elements of adaptation in the past 
decade, suggesting that power-sharing is not necessarily incompatible with right-wing 
(or left-wing) ideologies. Center-right political actors often develop effective and 
credible ties with external peace actors, such as the European Union. Similar 
processes of positive adaptation towards moderation can also occur in leftist political 
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traditions. For instance, in Spain, the left has traditionally supported power-sharing 
arrangements with Catalans and Basques, often against the wishes of right-wing 
opposition, while in Cyprus, several impressive mobilizations by the Turkish Cypriot 
left have demonstrated a clear desire to transcend the Cyprus stalemate.  
While encouraging, such breakthroughs remain few and far between. Political 
parties seldom reach consensus in issues of power-sharing, as moderate parties 
frequently face ethnic outbidding by intra-ethnic rivals. In the presence of dominant 
nationalist perceptions, it is easier for the masses to adopt political views uncritically 
and act in ways that strengthen existing elite consensus, thus creating a vicious cycle 
between public expectations and the viability of federal or consociational projects. 
Even moderate elites may shy away from promising peace settlements, if they 
perceive them as politically risky or unfeasible. Arguably, a reassuring international 
environment for political accommodation might enable domestic actors to reassess 
their positions. In the end, we are left wondering whether power-sharing fails because 
external actors actively work against it or because domestic forces have not acted pre-
emptively to neutralize destructive outside influences ± or both.  
  
µ3RZHU-VKDULQJLVGHVWUXFWLYH¶ 
A third common perception is that power-sharing cannot resolve issues of multi-
ethnicity. A core understanding driving the current Syrian crisis is that federalism and 
consociationalism have devastating effects and could worsen ethnic and religious 
conflicts. For the most part, critics say power-sharing in various forms has failed in 
the region. The relatively recent examples of Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia and 
post-1960 Cyprus have consolidated the view of federalism and consociationalism as 
dysfunctional, if not catastrophic. Sadly, the region lacks an indisputably successful 
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consociational or federal model which could inspire others to follow suit. Looking at 
the period between World Wars I and II, Ramet points out that while Norway and 
Finland in Europe provided models of what newly independent states could be, there 
was no similar model for the Balkans (2006:3). More recently in Iraq, external and 
domestic critics alike have emphasized the absence of a relevant federal example. For 
instance, Muslim religious leaders, DVZHOODVµOLEHUDODQGGHPRFUDWLF¶SROLWLFLDQV, 
KDYHVWUHVVHGWKHQHHGWRSUHVHUYHWKHFRXQWU\
VXQLW\DQGKDYHIUHTXHQWO\µXUJHGWKH
Kurds not to rush into formulae like federalism and confederalism with which the 
region is not familiar¶ (Mideast Mirror 2004; emphasis added). As argued elsewhere 
(Loizides 2016), Ottoman institutions and religious legacies of tolerance preserved 
cultural diversity for centuries; despite their embedded hierarchical nature, they could 
have provided the political and cultural antecedents for federal and consociational 
arrangements. But the reading of the Ottoman past is frequently limited to brief 
references in national history books and is highly selective.  
In fact, how elites publically frame the millet legacy in post-Ottoman 
successor states makes the public endorsement of federal and consociational 
arrangements difficult, if not impossible. Through a series of false analogies, 
contemporary critics compare recent minority accommodation proposals in the form 
of power-sharing or community recognition to the millet system and its role in the 
YLROHQWFROODSVHRIWKH2WWRPDQ(PSLUH%HUNHV2QHH[DPSOHLV6RQ\HO¶V
Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire (1993), published by the 
Ataturk Culture, Language and History Foundation, an institution devoted to the 
preservation of Kemalist thought in Turkey. Such perceptions preclude any discussion 
of federalism, in either the official Turkish Republican ideology or the broader 
PDMRULW\GLVFRXUVHVLQWKHFRXQWU\LQFOXGLQJ$.3¶VFRXQWHU-hegemonic positioning. 
 10 
Thus, despite the general liberalization since the 1990s of Turkish discourse on 
domestic and regional identity representation (Somer 2005; Fokas 2008), institutional 
transformation through power-sharing does not feature in the political discourse. 
Instead, Turkey has moved towards an increasingly majoritarian (semi-presidential) 
system and will fully endorse presidentialism in the near future.  
State institutions play a central role in maintaining hegemonic perceptions on 
political accommodation, particularly when confronted with contrary examples from 
other parts of the world, including Spain, as mentioned earlier. After visiting Spain in 
1993, for instance, Turkish PM Tansu Çiller allegedly proposed the use of the Basque 
model to solve the conflict in Kurdish regions, something she later denied (Pope 
1993: 14). Her rival and ANAP successor Mesut Yilmaz rejected the idea of 
federation with the Kurds and stated that regional cultures in Turkey must be allowed 
to exist through their own means (TRT TV 1992). On another occasion, Yilmaz said 
the Kurdish language should become the second official language in Turkey, but this 
proposal was eliminated before any debate could take place (McDowall 1997: 428).  
More recently, in early 2007, a Turkish prosecutor initiated a criminal inquiry 
against former President and coup leader Kenan Evren for even suggesting Turkey 
should become a federation. Drawing on his early proposal for administrative regions, 
Evren had spoken openly in the media, suggesting Turkey would one day decide on 
IHGHUDOLVPRWKHUZLVHµWKHUHZLOOEHQRSHDFH¶KHVDLGDGGLQJWKDWWKHWHQSHUFHQW
election threshold obstructed Kurds from getting into Parliament (Turkish Daily News 
2007). Not surprisingly, reactions were overwhelmingly negative, with some 
attributing WRWKHIRUPHU*HQHUDO¶V comments to insanity.  
 
Protracted Stalemates: Alternative Explanations  
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Lack of political accommodation and stalled conflicts in the Mediterranean region are 
also driven by structural conditions.  There is for instance significant variation in 
external intervention strategies and other structural conditions across historical and 
contemporary conflicts in the Mediterranean region, including size, regime type, 
natural resources and level of economic development. Structural factors certainly 
contribute to the emergence and implementation of federal and consociational 
settlements, but no easily identifiable set of structural conditions is shared by most 
cases presented here.  
As noted above, alternative accommodation formulas have failed despite 
historical institutional precedents, ethnic or linguistic affinities, and major external 
incentives, as dePRQVWUDWHGLQWKHODVWIHZGHFDGHVE\WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶V
intervention in 2004 Cyprus. Another factor in understanding stalemates and political 
accommodation in the Mediterranean region is the impact of colonial rule. While 
acknowledging this factor, it is important to consider the experience of other countries 
before reaching any conclusions. For one thing, the success of federal arrangements is 
not confined to industrial nation-states out of which no federation has failed since 
WWII (Bermeo 2002). For another, in much of the developing world, successful 
federations and consociations have survived and even thrived in volatile regional 
environments. These include a number of former colonies, such as India, Nigeria, 
Brazil, Ethiopia, South Africa and Indonesia, whose socioeconomic and political 
conditions, arguably, are similar to those in the Middle East or the post-Ottoman 
Balkans. Thus, explanations emphasizing colonial effects might not adequately 
account for the nature of stalled state-building in the region. Faced with comparable 
challenges, other post-colonial leaders, for example, in India, have successfully 
countered colonial legacies by embracing political secularism and federal 
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accommodation that offered symmetrical treatment to the various religious and ethnic 
communities across the country (Kohli 2004). In contrast, it could be argued that in 
the eastern part of the Mediterranean, coercive power-sharing has WXUQHGWKHUHJLRQ¶V
µHDUO\DGYDQWDJH¶RIWROHUDQFHLQWRDQXQIRUWXQDWHGHPRQVWUDWLRQRIhow federalism 
and consociationalism can lack prospects or viability.  
Finally, it is useful to draw comparisons with post-communist societies in the 
Balkans as well. Critics of power-sharing in the region claim ethno-federalism 
facilitates nationalist mobilization and state disintegration (Bunce 1999). For Bunce, 
the design of these systems puts into place virtually all of the building blocks 
necessary for the rise of nationalist movements (ibid: 49). This process seems 
confined to communist federations, although a similar argument could be made for 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. In Yugoslavia, Stefanovic identifies the 
SUREOHPDVWKHFRXQWU\¶VFHQWUDOLVPQRWIHGHUDOLVP+HDUJXHVWKDWµGHVSLWHLWVIRUPDO
federal character, the centralized organization of the Communist Party, which wielded 
SROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFSRZHULQVXUHGWKDW<XJRVODYLDZDVDXQLWDU\VWDWH¶
IRUWKFRPLQJ+HFRQFOXGHVµ&RPPXQLVW<XJRVODYLDZDVnot a genuine federation 
as the communist federations were federal in form but uQLWDU\LQFRQWHQW¶ibid; 
emphasis added; see also Connor 1984; McGarry 1998).  
 
Transcending Stalled Conflicts  
'HVSLWHWKHLUµIHGHUDODQGFRQVRFLDWLRQDOIDLOXUHV¶VRPHRIWKHVXFFHVVRUVWDWHVRIWKH
former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia, Kosovo and the Republic of Macedonia/ 
FYROM (like Lebanon) returned to such arrangements in the absence of alternatives 
and in the search for more genuine and viable forms of power-sharing. These states 
are already seeing some success: decreased violence, reduced international 
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involvement in peacekeeping commitments, and return in some areas of internally 
displaced persons. Admittedly, federalism and consociationalism are difficult to 
effectuate in prolonged stalemates, especially as these areas might resort to federalism 
or power-sharing when it is too late ± too much blood has been shed in the past, and 
any central authority or shared institutions including political parties have been 
absent. 
Yet a supporting international intervention could be the key in transcending 
the obstacles facing these renewed power-sharing projects. To cite few examples, 
Bosnia has at least partially avoided the fate of other post-conflict societies in the 
region where lines of division were perpetuated with almost zero returns. And power-
sharing provisions in the Republic of Macedonia/ FYROM prevented renewed 
violence after the short 2001 war despite predictions to the contrary.   
A key lesson from these cases, for instance a potentially federal or 
decentralized Syria, is that the later should combine decentralization with power-
sharing at the centre (consociationalism). A consociational arrangement will ensure 
WKDWWKHIXWXUHJRYHUQPHQWRI6\ULDZRXOGEHIXOO\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHFRXQWU\¶V
ethnic, linguistic and religious identities. A government of national unity inclusive of 
all democratically elected groups will prevent secessionist demands as all legitimate 
groups will feel represented in decision-making. Power-sharing will prevent situations 
where a territorially significant group becomes consistently excluded/ostracized from 
the central government. Such groups often respond with secession following attempts 
by others to ostracize them politically during negotiations to form a government. In 
environments of low inter-ethnic trust as in Syria, a constitutional formula has to be in 
place to ensure inclusivity, proportionality and functionality.   
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External peace allies and credible incentives are also critical in socializing 
undecided actors to overcome stalemates and accept a peace settlement compromise. 
Yet external mediation and power-sharing institutions could be designed to better 
accommodate domestic political parties and their needs. And as demonstrated in the 
broader literature, external intervention works best in areas where indigenous 
leadership has been extensively engaged in decision-making and implementation 




This chapter reaches three conclusions in its analysis of stalemates in the 
Mediterranean region. First, traditions of elite accommodation and past legacies 
matter. On the one hand, they can sustain power-sharing arrangements (Daalder 1974; 
Lijphart 1977), but on the other, they can act as barriers to such arrangements if 
negative memories, nationalist narratives and false analogies prevail in the public 
discourse. Although contemporary federal and power-sharing models differ greatly 
IURPWKH2WWRPDQ(PSLUH¶Vmillet system, the communist Yugoslavia or the post-
colonial arrangements created for Cyprus and Lebanon, these cases sustain discourses 
negating contemporary attempts for political accommodation; they also constrain 
recent institutional innovations which could potentially overcome the stalled 
Mediterranean conflicts.   
Second, certain core features mark the stalled conflicts in the Mediterranean 
countries. Majority nationalisms in the region have confronted ethnic and religious 
diversity not only by eliminating differences through ethnic cleansing and genocide 
(commonly associated with both the Southern European and the post-Ottoman 
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FRXQWULHVEXWDOVRE\LQFRUSRUDWLQJHYHQJORULI\LQJGLYHUVHµIRONORUH¶WUDGLWLRQV
provided these are adjusted to fit within the parameters of the dominant state 
nationalism (Hobsbawm 1992; Triandafyllidou 1998:606). In a nutshell, it is not 
surprising that the roots of many contemporary stalled conflicts from Morocco to 
Southeast Turkey and the former Yugoslavia lie not in exclusion and oppositional 
state-building programs but in ambitious efforts to forcibly integrate and assimilate 
XQZLOOLQJµKDOI-EURWKHUVDQGVLVWHUV¶6WHIDQRYLF 
Third, power-sharing and federalism could be appropriate antidotes to ongoing 
conflicts in this volatile region. This is particularly important for the current debates 
on the day after in Syria and Iraq. The Arab and South Slav unification projects 
discussed above are not the only cases in point. The essence of the Macedonian or 
Kurdish conflict in the 20th century does not lie in the exclusiveness of neighboring 
QDWLRQDOLVPVEXWLQWKHLQYROXQWDU\LQFRUSRUDWLRQRIµEURWKHUO\FRPPXQLWLHV¶LQWR
narrowly defined centralized nationalist programs. In fact, recent examples from post-
war Yugoslavia and elsewhere suggest that the appropriate institutional design could 
overcome ideational and structural barriers. As mentioned elsewhere, in most 
conflictual environments, the relative success of power-sharing should be understood 
in relation to previous records of civil strife (Loizides 2016). Following this 
reasoning, post-Franco Spain, post-Taif Lebanon, more recently, post-Arab Spring 
7XQLVLDDQG0RURFFRDUHµUHODWLYHVXFFHVV¶VWRULHV=DKDU%LHEHU2¶/HDU\
2005; Belloni 2008). These cases also suggest that there is no uniform pattern of 
conflict or stalemate in the Mediterranean region.  
Admittedly, re-introducing power-sharing in difficult cases where previous 
experience has been negative might require major investment and support from 
outside actors, at least for a transitional period. In addition, related peace mediations 
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require a deep understanding of the arguments of critics. It is essential to confront the 
arguments of those who oppose power-sharing and to design institutional 
arrangements that ease potential defects. Besides analyzing stalled conflicts and 
failures, we need to identify conflict-mitigating institutions that have been most 
HIIHFWLYHXQGHUµOHDVWOLNHO\¶FRQGLWLRQV7KHµWUDQVIHUDELOLW\SRWHQWLDO¶RIVXFK
institutional arrangements lies in their capacity to mitigate µmost difficult¶ conflict 
situations, setting the stage for comparable arrangements in similar or less 
complicated environments. A challenge for future research is identifying the key 
aspects of peace processes that could offer inspiration, especially in the most troubled 
countries in the Mediterranean region.  
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1
 Consociationalism, among other key features, stipulates that power be shared by 
majorities and minorities, and it implies formal or informal veto rights for all parties 
(Lijphart 1977, 0F*DUU\DQG2¶/HDU\). Consociationalism involves power-
sharing at the center for instance through the collective presidency in Bosnia or the 
allocation of certain key posts to members of specific groups as in Lebanon. 
Federalism refers to situations where authority is territorially divided between central 
and provincial governments, with both enjoying constitutionally separate 
competencies. Federations could be also consociations, as in Belgium and 
Switzerland, but not all federations are consociations, as in the United States and 
Australia. In addition, it could be argued that some federations function as semi-
consociations, as in Canada and India. Semi-consociations include some elements of 
consociations but not others, for instance proportionality and community autonomy 
but no guarantees for long-term power-sharing or fully effective veto rights. There are 
also consociational agreements with territorially intermingled populations that do not 
take a federal form, such as post-1960 Cyprus, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland after 
the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Power-sharing could take either territorial or non-
territorial forms through the inclusion of ethnic minority parties in the central 
government and guaranteed veto rights (see also Loizides 2016). 
